

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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O 091953Z JUN 78
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0695
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 08831

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: OSI WORKING GROUP MEETING,
JUNE 8, 1978

CTB MESSAGE NO. 239

1. SUMMARY: WORKING GROUP MET JUNE 8 TO COMPLETE PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF US AND SOVIET DELS' ILLUSTRATIVE TEXTS ON OSI RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS. DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON: DIFFERENCES OVER PHOTOGRAPHIC PROCEDURES; MEASURES TO VERIFY THAT EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WOULD NOT BE USED FOR PURPOSES UNRELATED TO OSIS; WHETHER TEXT SHOULD INCLUDE LIST OF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT TO BE SUPPLIED BY HOST PARTY; AND WHETHER TEXT SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL. THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS SEEMED TO BE MATTER OF SPECIAL SENSITIVITY FOR SOVIETS. END SUMMARY.

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2. CONTINUING HIS REVIEW OF SOVIET TEXT FROM PREVIOUS MEETING, HECKROTTE (US) QUERIED THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO USE THE SAME PHOTO PROCEDURES AS IN THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATY WHEREBY THE HOST PARTY WOULD MAKE ALL PHOTOS AT REQUEST OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL. HE POINTED OUT THAT ALTHOUGH THE PNE TREATY INVOLVED A QUESTION OF UNAUTHORIZED PHOTOS OF NUCLEAR DEVICES, OSIS WOULD BE

FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT AND LESS SENSITIVE SITUATION. HE ADDED THAT US FIELD TESTING HAD SHOWN PNET PHOTO PROCEDURES TO BE CUMBERSOME AND QUESTIONED THE DESIRABILITY OF PERPETUATING THEM IN A CTBT. BEZUMOV (USSR) COUNTERED THAT PURPOSE IN BOTH CASES WAS TO MAKE SURE CAMERAS WERE NOT USED FOR PURPOSES UNRELATED TO AGREED INSPECTIONS, AND FOR EXAMPLE THERE WOULD BE NO WAY TO LIMIT PHOTOS IF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL HAD CAMERAS WITH TELEPHOTO LENSES. HE ADDED THAT SOVIET PROCEDURES WOULD ASSURE DESIGNATED PERSONNEL OF ALL THE PHOTOS THEY WANTED, AND SHOULD HAVE, WHETHER IN SOVIET, US OR UK TERRITORY.

3. ON PROVISION TO ASSURE THAT EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL WOULD NOT BE DIVERTED TO PURPOSES OTHER THAN OSIS, HECKROTTE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET TEXT FOLLOWED THE PNE TREATY BY REQUIRING THE INSPECTING PARTY TO TURN OVER DUPLICATE SETS OF ALL EQUIPMENT TO THE HOST PARTY. THIS WAS REASONABLE IN VIEW OF HOST PARTY'S CONCERN THAT MONITORING EQUIPMENT LOCATED NEAR A PNE DEVICE SHOULD NOT DO MORE THAN DETERMINE YIELD OF EXPLOSION. BUT PROCEDURES COULD BE LESS RIGOROUS FOR OSIS, AND THE US TEXT CALLING FOR EXAMINATION AT THE PORT OF ENTRY WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. BEZUMOV REPLIED THAT THE PNET WAS NOT CONCERNED SOLELY WITH PROTECTING INFORMATION ABOUT THE PNE DEVICE SINCE
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IT REQUIRED THE INSPECTING PARTY TO SUPPLY TWO SETS OF ALL EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING SEISMIC EQUIPMENT THAT WAS FAR REMOVED FROM THE EXPLOSION. MOREOVER, THE FIVE-DAY DEADLINE FOR MOVING DESIGNATED PERSONNEL FROM THE PORT OF ENTRY, AS PROPOSED BY THE US, WOULD NOT PERMIT AN ADEQUATE EXAMINATION OF THEIR EQUIPMENT. IF THE PNET PROCEDURE WERE ADOPTED, THERE WOULD BE NO LOSS OF TIME SINCE EXAMINATION OF ONE SET OF EQUIPMENT COULD GO ON WHILE THE OTHER SET WAS BEING TRANSPORTED TO THE INSPECTION AREA.

4. REFERRING TO PROVISION ON SUPPORT EQUIPMENT SUPPLIED BY THE HOST PARTY, HECKROTTE POINTED OUT THAT THE US DRAFT INCLUDED A LIST OF EQUIPMENT AND ASKED WHY THE LIST WAS OMITTED BY THE SOVIETS. HE COMMENTED THAT SUCH A LIST WAS INCLUDED IN THE PNET BUT IN THIS INSTANCE THE SOVIETS HAD CHOSEN NOT TO FOLLOW THE PNET EXAMPLE. MOREOVER, THE SOVIET TEXT GAVE NO GUARANTEE THAT THE HOST PARTY WOULD SUPPLY SUPPORT EQUIPMENT NEEDED BY DESIGNATED PERSONNEL. THE US DRAFT, ON THE OTHER HAND, ESTABLISHED THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE HOST TO SUPPLY EQUIPMENT AND LISTED SPECIFIC ITEMS THAT WOULD BE COMMON

TO ALL OSIS, WHILE REQUIRING AGREEMENT ON OTHER ITEMS.
FAKLEY (UK) SUPPORTED THE US TEXT, ARGUING THAT THE
SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO LIST BASIC EQUIPMENT IN THE ANNEX,
AND IT WOULD BE CONSISTENT TO LIST SUPPORT EQUIPMENT IN
THE SAME WAY. BEZUMOV REPLIED THAT THE US LIST WAS
UNNECESSARY SINCE LIST WAS OPEN-ENDED. MOREOVER,
SPECIFIC ITEMS LISTED MIGHT NOT BE NEEDED IN ALL CASES.
THE LANGUAGE OF SUCH A SERIOUS AND IMPORTANT TREATY
SHOULD BE MORE PRECISE. PROVISION IN THE PNET LISTING

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SUPPORT EQUIPMENT REPRESENTED A SHORTCOMING IN DRAFTING,
ACCORDING TO BEZUMOV.

5. HECKROTTE NOTED SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN THE US AND
SOVIET TEXTS DEALING WITH ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS
OF DESIGNATED PERSONNEL, ESPECIALLY THE FACT THAT THE
US TEXT CONTAINED AN ILLUSTRATIVE LIST AND THE SOVIET
TEXT DID NOT. HE SAID THE LIST WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE
THE PARTIES SHOULD HAVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ABOUT
WHAT ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS THERE MIGHT POSSIBLY
BE. FOR EXAMPLE, AN AERIAL SURVEY COULD BE VERY USEFUL
FOR AN OSI. HE THEREFORE WONDERED WHY THE SOVIETS HAD
OMITTED THE LIST. BEZUMOV REPLIED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE OSIS WHERE AERIAL SURVEYS WOULD BE
NEEDED. A LIST SUCH AS THE US DEL PROPOSED COULD ONLY
BE JUSTIFIED IF IT COULD BE SHOWN THAT THE PARTICULAR
PROCEDURES OR EQUIPMENT LISTED WOULD BE NECESSARY IN A

MAJORITY OF OSIS. OTHERWISE IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT
TO EXPLAIN WHY SUCH PROCEDURES OR EQUIPMENT WERE
INCLUDED IN THE TREATY. MOREOVER, LISTING SPECIFIC
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PROCEDURES WOULD HAVE THE FLAVOR OF MAKING THEM
OBLIGATORY.

6. FAKLEY ARGUED IN REBUTTAL TO BEZUMOV THAT THE US TEXT
ON ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS EXPLICITLY STATED
THEY WERE SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT. HE SUPPORTED INCLUSION
OF THE US LIST ON PRESENTATIONAL GROUNDS. WITHOUT THE
LIST IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO EXPLAIN TO UK MINISTERS AND
PUBLIC WHAT WAS MEANT BY ADDITIONAL RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS.
BEZUMOV RETORTED THAT FAKLEY'S NEED TO EXPLAIN TO
MINISTERS WOULD NOT SEEM A CONSIDERATION IN THE NEGOTIA-
TIONS; IN ANY CASE, IT WOULD BE EQUALLY DIFFICULT FOR
THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO EXPLAIN INCLUSION OF
A LIST. JOHNSON

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